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BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAWSUIT:
A SOCIAL NORMS THEORY OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
BY CLAIRE A. HILL*
ABSTRACT
Complex business contracts are notoriously difficult to write and
read. Certainly, when litigation arises, courts scarcely have an easy time
interpreting them. Indeed, contracts don't look at all as though they are
written to tell a court what the parties want. Why can't smart, well-
motivated lawyers do a better job? My article argues that they rationally do
not try. I argue for a view of contracting in which parties are not princi-
pally trying to set forth an agreement for a court to enforce. Rather, by
leaving inartful language and ambiguity in the agreement, parties are
bonding themselves not to seek precipitous recourse to litigation. The
agreement entered into provides each party with grounds to bring a lawsuit
if it so desires. Thus, if one party sues, the other party will virtually always
have grounds to countersue. The complex transacting community has a
norm against litigation in any event; bonding encourages and bolsters this
norm, as well as norms of appropriate conduct throughout the contracting
relationship. The contracting process, and the contract that results, thus
serves importantly to create the parties' relationship and to set the stage for
dispute resolution consistent with preserving the relationship, as well as to
keep available the backstop of enforcement if needed.
"When our corporate group drafts a contract, we're twice
blessed."
Litigator, prominent N.Y. law fnmn.
*Professor and Director, Institute for Law and Rationality, University of Minnesota Law
School. Thanks to Lisa Bernstein, Albert Choi, Jacob Corr6, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Steven
Davidoff, Mary Eaton, Allan Erbsen, Dan Gifford, Tom Hill, Brett McDonnell, Bill McGeveran,
Erin O'Hara, Francesco Parisi, Dan Schwarcz, Larry Solan, and participants at the American Law
and Economics Association conference for helpful comments and conversations.
'As my colleague Brett McDonnell points out, this statement might be read to dispute rather
than further my thesis. In my reading, the lawyer meant that the low quality of his corporate
partners' drafting assured significant legal expense if the contract were to be litigated. The lawyer
was not speaking to the likelihood that the contract would be litigated. Professor McDonnell notes
that the lawyer might have been saying not just that the litigation was apt to be quite expensive given
the unclear drafting, but also that the unclear drafting, caused by the corporate lawyers'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Voluminous literature considers what the law governing contracts
should be, and how the applicable legal regime will affect the behavior of
contracting parties. What gap-filling and default rules should courts use?
What rules would a majority of contracting parties prefer? When should
rules be designed to motivate parties to contract around them? To what
extent should courts use parol evidence, and for what purposes? Under what
circumstances, if any, should custom, trade, course of performance, or course
of dealing override the parties' written agreement? What is the proper scope
of implied terms such as "good faith," "fair dealing," and "reasonable
efforts"? What interpretive conventions should courts use?
I argue here that in the context of complex business contracting-
mergers, joint ventures, financing arrangements, leasing arrangements,
license agreements, and so on between sophisticated parties-the answers to
these questions may not matter nearly as much as is typically supposed.2
Parties bargain in the shadow of the lawsuit as much as the law: that enforce-
ment will be costly and uncertain affects how, and how much, they bargain.
This effect swamps the effect of incremental improvements in law. Given the
complexity and singularity of the subject matter at issue, and how much
what parties will want depends on matters that cannot be known at the time
of contracting (such as the state of their relationship when difficulties arise),
articulating possible contingencies and agreeing on how to deal with them ex
ante may be worse than leaving ex post flexibility.
How do parties bargain in the shadow of the lawsuit? First, they do
less than they might to "complete" their contracts. All immediate issues are
addressed, as are parties' (or their lawyers') "hot button" issues and other
issues that become salient to one or both parties. But the form documents
used for the transaction are not kept up-to-date, nor is the final product in a
particular transaction cleaned up to eliminate confusing cross-references and
possible ambiguities before the parties bind themselves to it (or afterwards,
for that matter). While parties do ask themselves throughout the contracting
process what they might have missed, the inquiry is not nearly as systematic
incompetence, made litigation more likely.
2In this regard, see Avery W. Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional
Perspective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 169, 171 (2005). Katz argues that "legal scholars should
focus more on addressing the contractual decisions of private lawmakers (that is, transactional
lawyers and their clients) and less on the decisions of public lawmakers (that is, courts and
legislatures)." Id. See also Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1745, 1762 (1996) (suggesting that more attention should be devoted to the substantive concerns of
the private lawmakers than to the jurisdictional question of who is the best lawmaker).
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as it might be. Second, parties could do more to reduce costs by more often
choosing arbitration or waiving juries; they do not.
But parties are doing the best they can, given the complexity and
singularity of the subject matter, and that the types of parties entering into
complex business contracts will not be wholly homogeneous. The former
suggests that anticipating and addressing contingencies will not be easy-
certainly, for many contingencies, there will not be a choice of standard
provisions helpfully interpreted by the courts. The latter suggests that not-
withstanding the existence of a complex transacting community that
constrains parties' behavior, there will not be sufficient community consen-
sus as to acceptable behavior to obviate the need for protracted negotiations
and a quite detailed contract. Indeed, the negotiations serve an important
function other than memorializing the parties' agreement: they help each
party understand whether the other, and the transaction contemplated, is
suitable for their needs. I give an account of contracting in which parties are
appropriately balancing costs and benefits, but both the costs and benefits
are different than is commonly supposed.
In my account, in contracting, parties are not principally trying to set
forth an agreement for a court to enforce. The contracting process, and the
contract that results, importantly serves to create the parties' relationship and
to set the stage for dispute resolution consistent with preserving the relation-
ship, as well as to keep available the backstop of enforcement if needed.
Sometimes there are economies of scope in these functions. For instance,
creating the relationship involves defining what the relationship is; parties
bargain to determine what they want and write it down in a document they
can bind themselves to and later bring to court. But there are potential dis-
economies as well. If parties seek to capture the last, costliest attempt at
precision, they probably will not commensurately reduce their end game
costs. Indeed, they may increase such costs. Bargaining more than the com-
munity norm may shrink the reputational penumbra otherwise created by the
contract, encouraging an ethos in which whatever is not prohibited is
permitted. Accommodation that might help relationship preservation may
thereby be crowded out, replaced by a more literalistic and opportunistic
mindset on the part of both parties.
This article proceeds as follows. In Part H, I argue that contracts don't
look as though they are being written principally to show a court what the
parties want. I argue as well that the contracting process does not seem
sensibly designed to elicit contracts that would serve this function. Part III
argues that contracts, as (imperfectly) written, and the contracting process, as
(imperfectly) conducted, serve important functions. Part III also responds to
various objections to my arguments. Part IV argues that the contracting
process is sensibly designed to minimize parties' aggregate costs. Parties
2009]
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stop the process of finalizing their contract before attempting to capture even
fairly obvious increments of precision and clarity; in so doing, they are
minimizing the sum of their relationship creation, preservation, and end
game costs. Part V concludes.
11. THE "IMPERFECTIONS" OF CONTRACTS
AND THE CONTRACTING PROCESS
A. Imperfections in General
In other work, I have made the (perhaps uncontroversial) claim that
contracts are unnecessarily long and complicated, and not infrequently have
"ambiguities that too readily allow for multiple interpretations. "3 Contracts
are redundant, with cumbersome, inartful, and imprecise drafting. What I
have called "band-aid" fixes are often used: "anything in the foregoing to the
contrary notwithstanding," or "for purposes solely of this Section Z, word A
shall mean and include ....
Matters would be bad enough if parties "started fresh" in every
transaction with a real fill-in-the-blanks form, but they do not. They start
with what they call a form, but what is actually an already heavily cluttered
document used in a previous deal and not "cleaned up." 5 Add in the force of
3See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts are Written in "Legalese," 77 CiH1.-KENTL. REv. 59,75
(2001). 4Considering the circumstances in which the contracts are drafted-late at night, by people
who have had very little sleep-that band-aid solutions, rather than more global solutions, are used is
not surprising. But why does contracting proceed in this way? I argue in the text that parties benefit
from the contracts that result from this process, but the question warrants more of an answer. I have
also discussed the contracting process in more depth in Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and
Norms in Complex Business Contracting, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29 (2001) (arguing that when
parties bind themselves to a contract, they are binding themselves as much or more to a relationship
as they are to each of the specific terms of the contract); and Hill, supra note 3, at 76 (describing the
functions served by the process of using documents from previous transactions as forms).5See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISMONs 500-01 (1975). Freund, a leading corporate lawyer, has
his alter ego, Perry Prudent, chastise a junior lawyer for using a last draft because that draft
contained concessions obtained in the negotiating process. The first drafts may be less cluttered than
the later drafts, but they are scarcely uncluttered. And in any event, in my experience, the (relatively
junior) contract drafter is told which deal to use as a precedent but is not directed to an early or later
draft. Freund's depiction also seems idealized (or more precisely, not generalizable) when his alter
ego criticizes the junior lawyer for adding unnecessary boilerplate to deal with a too-remote
contingency. See also id. at 500 (Perry Prudent tells the junior attorney, Pete: "And then, in the one
place you did a little thinking, Pete, it seems to me you went too far. I know it's possible that they'll
repeal the Copyright Act some day, but it doesn't really rise to a level of probability sufficient to
warrant three pages of provisions conditional upon that event."). In my experience, such criticisms
were never made.
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cumulation, not only for negotiated terms but also for so-called "boilerplate,"
and the result is a contract that is not nearly as clear as it could be, and that
offers manifold opportunities for disputes after the fact.6 Some (indeed,
probably many) of these opportunities could be addressed at the time of
contracting.7 Parties could "clean up" contracts before signing them-but
they do not. And, one might think, they should. The stereotype of bleary-
eyed corporate lawyers negotiating late into the night is indeed true.
Lawyers do not take a dispassionate day or two after the dust clears to afford
their more rested selves a chance to review and correct, if necessary, what
their very tired selves wrote.
And they have ample reason to fear that their more rested selves might
catch something their tired selves did not. Consider the "band-aids": are
people really sure that a particular "band-aid" agreed on in the middle of the
night should override all else in "the foregoing" or "in Section X of this
agreement"? What about even broader such provisions: "anything in this
Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding"?
In this regard, consider the expert testimony of John Coates, a Harvard
law professor and former partner at Wachtell Lipton, in United Rentals, Inc.
v. RAM Holdings, Inc.8 one of the many recent cases in which a private
equity firm was seeking not to buy a company it had contracted to buy:
One of the ways that the parties commonly economize on time
and costs is to not attempt to review every provision of every
related agreement every time a new change is made,
6My characterization of contracting accords with that set forth in Adams Drafting, Costly
Drafting Errors, Part 3-United Rentals Versus Cerberus, http://adamsdrafting.com/system/2007/
12/23/uri-versus-cerberus/ (Dec. 23, 2007). The author writes:
I think the fault lies with how even the most exalted law firms go about generating
deal documentation:
" First, start with precedent contracts generated by a haphazard process of
accretion and without recourse to any set of rules.
* Second, have the drafting done by junior associates who have learned by
osmosis rather than through any structured process. One can count on them
to regurgitate, on a wing and a prayer, the language of precedent contracts.
" Third, have the drafting reviewed by senior associates and partners who have
never had to measure their drafting against any objective standards. Generally
they're serenely confident of their superior talents and immune to suggestions
that their documentation is flawed.
* Fourth, in revising contracts during the course of negotiation, shoehorn the
revisions into the existing language, no matter how cumbersome the result.
* And fifth, do all this at a breakneck pace that precludes measured reflection.
Id.
71d.
8937 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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particularly when documents are in the final stages of
negotiation. Rather, they rely on succinct but legal terms of art
to achieve what is, in essence, "editing" of the entirety of a
document with minimal change. Among the terms of art
customarily relied upon are phrases such as "subject to" or
"notwithstanding." These phrases allow the parties to specify
that one phrase or provision will take precedence over others,
and thus avoid the need to attempt to synthesize every
provision of every related agreement that is or may be partly or
wholly in conflict with the provision in question.
9
A blog post quoting the Coates report notes:
I find more interesting [Chancellor Chandler's] statement in
[ruling on the affidavit]: Remarkably, in his report, Professor
Coates appears to excuse practices that can only be described
as inartful drafting as "one of the ways that the parties [to
buyout negotiations] commonly economize on time and costs."
Professor Coates states that the parties, in contravention of
basic principles of contract interpretation and drafting, use
certain phrases (e.g., "subject to" or "notwithstanding") so as to
"avoid the need to attempt to synthesize every provision of
every related agreement that is or may be partly or wholly in
conflict with the provision in question." Not surprisingly,
disputes often arise precisely because of provisions that are
"partly or wholly in conflict" with each other.'0
Indeed. It is, of course, absolutely true that parties at the last minute
(and, really, throughout negotiations) negotiate and agree to use "notwith-
standing" clauses. But Coates's testimony makes it seem as though each use
progressively trumps all previous uses in some easy and uncontroversial
9Expert report of Professor John C. Coates IV at 10-11, United Rentals, Inc. v. Ram
Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 2007) (No. 3360-CC), available at http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/mergers/files/102xx-expert-report_12062007.pdf. For a very insightful discussion of
the affidavit and the case, see M&A Law Prof Blog, The Expert Opinion of John C. Coates, IV,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/12/coates-expert-t.html (Dec. 7, 2007). Note that
Chancellor Chandler, deciding the case for the Delaware Court of Chancery, found only the factual
portions of Coates's affidavit admissible. United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., No. 3360-
CC, 2007 WL 4465520, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 2007).
10M&A Law Prof Blog, URI Reply, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/
week50/index.html (Dec. 14, 2007) (quoting United Rentals, 2007 WL 446550, at *1 n.7).
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way. Certainly, when people agree on a "notwithstanding" clause, they may
think (or more likely, hope) that is the case. Somebody has identified
something that could look like, or is, a conflict among two provisions, or
suspects that there might be such a conflict. The parties agree that they
intend a particular provision to govern generally, or over the identified or
suspected conflict "notwithstanding anything in Section X to the contrary" or
"notwithstanding anything else in this Agreement to the contrary." But they
don't usually look comprehensively and thoroughly, either during the frenzy
of the negotiations or the calm that succeeds them, at the ramifications of the
new "notwithstanding" clause on the rest of the agreement.
B. Examples From Private Equity
As market conditions have declined, many private equity firms have
sought to not consummate acquisitions they had previously agreed to.11 In a
reversal of a previous norm not to litigate, cases are being litigated. In the
litigation, it has become clear that the parties' rights and obligations when the
buyer no longer wants to make the acquisition are anything but clear. There
are various types of provisions at issue: reverse termination fees, seller rights
to require specific performance, material adverse change clauses, and parties'
obligations to use best or reasonable efforts to obtain required approvals or
financing, or otherwise work to make the transaction possible. 12 It has
become clear that, in many cases, nobody looked closely (enough) at the
interaction of the provisions governing the buyer's and seller's rights and
obligations regarding the consummation of the deal.
"For a history of private equity transactions, including the recent trend wherein litigation
has become common between acquisition targets seeking to force private equity firms to
consummate acquisition transactions the firms had previously agreed to, or at least pay significant
damages, see generally Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1 148178; see also Wall
Street Journal Law Blog, Sexy M&A Litigation Alert: United Rentals Sues Cerberus, http:I/
blogs.wsj.comlaw/2007/11/20/sexy-ma-litigation-alert-united-rentals-sues-cerberus/ (Nov. 20, 2007
9:09 EST) (discussing the Delaware Court of Chancery's involvement in mergers and acquisitions
litigation).
The Cerberus-United Rentals flap continues a growing litigation trend: M&A deals
ending up in court after acquirers try to walk away from deals. In Sunday's New
York Times, Andrew Ross Sorkin reflected on these busted deals. "Private equity
firms, widely hailed as the "smart money," made some lousy deals in the second
half of this year, and some are now having a bad case of buyer's remorse," he
wrote. "Apparently all is fair in love, war and private equity."
Id. (quoting Andrew Ross Sorkin, If Buyout Firms Are So Smart, Why Are They So Wrong?, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2007, at 3.8).
12Davidoff, supra note 11, at 59.
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The foregoing offers some evidence for my position, and against
traditional views of contracting. But a few caveats must be acknowledged:
First, that in hindsight it is clear what should have been done does not mean
it would have been clear ex ante; traditional views appropriately emphasize
the ex ante perspective. Furthermore, the traditional views can readily
accommodate one dynamic probably at issue here: imprecision left by parties
to retain a litigation position, when they concluded that negotiations would
have yielded a worse result, a definitive rejection of their position(s)
(something also known as "leaving a strategic handle"). 13 Finally, as to (at
least) one type of provision, "material adverse change," 14 achieving clarity
may simply be exceedingly difficult: as a practical, and perhaps, theoretical,
matter, defining ex ante such a change in a manner that commands assent by
the parties and applies cleanly to a significant number of circumstances may
be impossible. Each side, genuinely or self-servingly, knows a material
adverse change when it sees it, and the two sides may see it differently. Still,
reading the slew of private equity cases now being litigated, it seems likely
that people did not sufficiently think through the circumstances in which the
provisions at issue might be implicated. Why wouldn't they have done so?
Because of the practice I discussed above and explain in the next section, to
stop sooner, before "completing" the agreement.' 5
In this regard, consider a recent blog posting:
Finally, for those interested in topping Darden's bid, the
termination fee is $39.6 million. If another bidder makes a
superior proposal, then under Section 5.02(b) of the merger
13See United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 845 (articulating a closely related rationale: "in fact,
parties often riddle their agreements with a certain amount of ambiguity in order to reach a
compromise"); supra note 8 and accompanying text. This rationale is discussed infra Part II.
14For an interesting explanation of MAC (material adverse change) or MAE (material
adverse effect) clauses, see Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral
Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330 (2005). The authors reject a "symmetry
hypothesis" in favor of an "investment hypothesis"-that such a clause encourages the target to
make investments that are not feasibly contractible during the period between signing of the deal and
closing. Id. at 332.
15Note that in civil law countries, the parties stop contracting far sooner than they do in the
United States. See generally Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as
Much With Fewer Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 889 (2004) (discussing contracting practices in
Germany). When parties stop is very much a function of convention among the relevant parties. In
both the United States and in civil law countries, though, attempting to keep negotiations going
beyond the traditional point at which one stops conveys a negative signal that one is not aware of or
willing to do what the conventions dictate, and perhaps that one is particularly inclined towards
litigation. I return to this point in the text accompanying infra note 46.
[Vol. 34
BARGAINNGINTE SHADOW OF THE LAWSU1T
agreement, RARE cannot terminate the agreement "unless
concurrently with such termination the Company pays to Parent
the Termination Fee and the Expenses payable pursuant to
Section 6.06(b)." The only problem? Expenses is used
repeatedly throughout the Agreement as a defined term every-
where except 6.06(b)-which makes no references to Expenses
or even expenses. In fact, it appears that nowhere does the
agreement define Expenses. Transaction expenses can some-
times be 1-2% of additional deal value, a significant amount
that any subsequent bidder must account for. So how much
should a subsequent bidder budget here? Or to rephrase, what
expenses must RARE pay if a higher bid emerges? And how
can RARE terminate the deal to enter into an agreement with
another bidder if RARE does not know which expenses it is so
required to pay? Darden may also want similar certainty as to
its reimbursed expenses, if any, in such a paradigm. Lots of
questions in this ambiguity. Not the biggest mistake in the
world, but Wachtell, attorneys for the buyer, and Alston &
Bird, attorneys for the seller [both sophisticated firms, with
Wachtell being one of the most prominent law firms in the US
and probably the world], both have incentives to fix this one. 
16
Bolstering my argument, consider that the ambiguity at issue was
probably in the "form' used as a basis for the documents rather than
introduced in this deal: somebody writing such provisions anew would
presumably also include a definition of Expenses. Most likely, the "form"
was generated over time, with the portion negotiated in a particular deal
being the one focused on in that deal: nobody read the whole document
sufficiently thoroughly to notice the missing definition. Indeed, in my
experience in practice and according to practitioners I have spoken to,
particularly when mistakes in definitions are found-where the definitions
do not work together, or where a term was supposed to be defined but is
not-the mistakes were also in the "form" used for the transaction in which
the mistake is discovered. Thus, when a mistake is found in one transaction
16M&A Law Prof Blog, Mistakes M&A Lawyers Make, http://Iawprofessors.typepad.con-/
mergers/2007/08/mistakes-ma-law.html (Aug. 20, 2007). In another recent, albeit less egregious,
example, the parties use the term "requisite transaction funds" but provide a definition for "required
transaction funds." See DealBook, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.
comI2008/09/10/smoke-gets-in-your-eyes/ (Sept. 10, 2008, 13:58 EST). Note that principles of
contractual interpretation could support construing the two terms differently: one need only argue
that the seeming mistake was actually a deliberate use of two different terms.
2009]
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document, it often also exists in many transactions done using the same
form.
One extreme example of a mistake from a form involves a medium-
sized private company. A clause that was supposed to say "you will not
compete" omitted the "not." The mistake appeared in all acquisition trans-
actions done by the company for an appreciable period of time. When the
mistake was pointed out to the lawyer who had drafted the documents and
done the transactions, he shrugged, noting that his client, the party exacting
the promise, had a position in the industry and vis-d-vis the would-be
competitor that would virtually ensure that the latter would not find it in its
interest to compete.17
Another example concerns a situation in which the parties' difficulties
may not have been due to "stopping sooner," but rather, to leaving open
litigation positions when full agreement would not have been possible. Still,
the case is worth discussing, principally to show that the use of the term
"notwithstanding" in a provision did not lead the court to view the provision
as trumping other provisions specifically referenced in the provision. The
case also illustrates the intricacy (to put it mildly) of the language courts are
called upon to interpret, and consequently, how close the determinations at
issue are. Commentators did not know how this case would come out, and
offered sound reasoning for many possible positions.1 8 Neither this holding
(nor this reasoning) nor a contrary holding (nor some alternative reasoning)
could readily be labeled "error."
The case at issue is the one discussed in the previous subpart, United
Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc.19 RAM Holdings and RAM Acqui-
sitions (collectively, RAM), corporations controlled by Cerberus Capital
Management, L.P., a major private equity firm, were formed to acquire
URI.2° URI, RAM, and, for some purposes, another affiliate of Cerberus
entered into a merger agreement (Merger Agreement) governing the terms by
which RAM would acquire URI. 21 At some point after entry into the Merger
Agreement, Cerberus (and therefore RAM) decided it did not want to
17Supporting material on file with The Delaware Journal of Corporate Law.
.
8See, e.g., M&A Law Prof Blog, URL/Cerebrus: The Compaint, http://lawprofessors.type
pad.com/mergers/2007/1 l/uri-legal-analy.htmil (Nov. 20, 2007); Concurring Opinions, The
Cereberus Case and Lessons in Law, Society, and Language, http://www.concurringopinions.
comlarchives/2007/12/thecerberusca.htiml (Dec. 22, 2007 9:57 EST); The Epicurean Dealmaker,
Lis Pendens, http://epicureandealmaker.blogspot.com2007/1 /lis-pendens.htmi (Nov. 21, 2007,
8:35 EST).
19937 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 2007).201d. at 814.
21id.
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acquire URI, and RAM informed URI that it would not be proceeding with
the acquisition.22 RAM took the position that, under the Merger Agreement,
it could terminate its obligations by paying a termination fee of $100
million.23 The Merger Agreement indeed provided that RAM could satisfy
its obligations by paying such a fee.24 However, it also provided for specific
performance, and URI took the position that it could require RAM to
consummate the transaction and filed suit.25 The court was called upon to
determine the relationship between the termination fee provision and the
specific performance provision. 26 The termination fee provision, section
8.2(e), had a "notwithstanding" clause:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement,
including with respect to Sections 7.4 and 9.10 [the specific
performance provision], (i) the Company's right to terminate
this Agreement in compliance with the provisions of Sections
8.1 (d)(i) and (ii) and its right to receive the Parent Termination
Fee pursuant to Section 8.2(c) or the guarantee thereof pursuant
to the Guarantee, and (ii) [RAM Holdings]'s right to terminate
this Agreement pursuant to Section 8.1 (e)(i) and (ii) and its
right to receive the Company Termination Fee pursuant to
Section 8.2(b) shall, in each case, be the sole and exclusive
remedy, including on account of punitive damages, of (in the
case of clause (i)) the Company and its subsidiaries against
[RAM Holdings], [RAM Acquisition], [Cerberus Partners] or
any of their respective affiliates, stockholders, general partners,
limited partners, members, managers, directors, officers,
employees or agents (collectively "Parent Related Parties")
and (in the case of clause (ii)) [RAM Holdings] and [RAM
Acquisition] against the Company or its subsidiaries, affiliates,
stockholders, directors, officers, employees or agents
(collectively "Company Related Parties"), for any and all loss
or damage suffered as a result thereof, and upon any
termination specified in clause (i) or (ii) of this Section 8.2(e)
and payment of the Parent Termination Fee or Company
Termination Fee, as the case may be, none of [RAM Holdings],
221d. at 827.
23United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 819.
241d. at 831.251d. at 831-32.
211d. at 836-37.
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[RAM Acquisition], [Cerberus Partners] or any of their
respective Parent Related Parties or the Company or any of the
Company Related Parties shall have any further liability or
obligation of any kind or nature relating to or arising out of this
Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement
as a result of such termination.27
Another part of section 8.2(e) provides that:
[i]n no event, whether or not this Agreement has been
terminated pursuant to any provision hereof, shall [RAM
Holdings], [RAM Acquisition], [Cerberus Partners] or the
Parent Related Parties, either individually or in the aggregate,
be subject to any liability in excess of the Parent Termination
Fee for any or all losses or damages relating to or arising out of
this Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement, including breaches by [RAM Holdings] or [RAM
Acquisition] of any representations, warranties, covenants or
agreements contained in this Agreement, and in no event shall
the Company seek equitable relief or seek to recover any
money damages in excess of such amount from [RAM
Holdings], [RAM Acquisition], [Cerberus Partners] or any
Parent Related Party or any of their respective
Representatives.28
The last sentence of section 8.2(a) provides that "[t]he parties acknowledge
and agree that, subject to Section 8.2(e), nothing in this Section 8.2 shall be
deemed to affect their right to specific performance under Section 9.10.,,29
URI claimed that it was entitled to specific performance under the
Merger Agreement; RAM claimed that URI was not.30 The court concluded
that there was no "single, shared understanding with respect to the avail-
ability of specific performance under the Merger Agreement. '31 It deemed
both interpretations reasonable and looked to extrinsic evidence. It ruled for
RAM, on the grounds that URI did not communicate its understanding that
"United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 816-17.
28Id. at 817 (italics and bracketed text are in the opinion, but not the Merger Agreement as
entered into by the parties).291d.
301d. at 832.
31 United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 836.
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specific performance was available to RAM, but RAM did communicate to
URI its understanding that specific performance was not available.32 URI,
therefore, did not meet its burden of persuasion.
33
Still, it is interesting to consider URI's argument that it was entitled to
specific performance, an argument deemed reasonable by the court. URI
accounted for the language providing that section 8.2(e) governs, and the
language in section 8.2(e) describing itself as the "sole and exclusive"
remedy against RAM when there has been a termination of the Merger
Agreement by either party, as follows: URI argued that the "sole and
exclusive" remedy is only such when there has been a termination of the
Merger Agreement as defined under the RAM-URI agreement, and there had
been no such termination. 34 URI also argued that the phrase "in excess of"
in the phrase prohibiting equitable remedies or money damages in excess of
the termination fee in section 8.2(e) applied only to equitable remedies that
involve monetary compensation-that what the phrase prohibits, in the realm
of equitable remedies, is such remedies in excess of the termination fee.35
URI also argued that the phrase in section 8.2(a) referring to specific
performance, albeit making it subject to section 8.2(e), showed the
availability of specific performance as a remedy, not eliminated notwith-
standing the parties' clear awareness of it.36 The court rejected RAM's
arguments that URI's construction was unreasonable, pointing to the
language in section 9.10 acknowledging that irreparable damage would
occur if the provisions in the RAM-URI agreement were not performed, and
that URI would be entitled to an injunction to enforce compliance. 37 "Given
this clarion language supporting the existence and availability of specific
performance, it is reasonable to read the limitations of section 8.2(e) in the
manner that URI has championed.
38
While deliberately ambiguous phraseology may have contributed to
the court's task, so too, importantly, did the general convention of drafting
using these kinds of clauses and cross-references. Surely, even the pro-
visions in this contract not involving any strategic ambiguity left by one or
both parties could have been far clearer.
321d. at 836.
331d.
34Id. at 831-32.
35 United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 831-33.361d. at 830-32.
371d. at 832.
38id
"
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Ill. AN EXPLANATION FOR CONTRACTING'S "IMPERFECTIONS":
HOW THE SPECTER OF COSTLY AND UNCERTAIN LITIGATION
BENEFITS THE PARTIES
Why don't parties (or, more precisely, their lawyers) clean up their
contracts after the fact? Smart and sophisticated parties can clearly do better,
and with some much-needed sleep, they would.39 Indeed, it is likely that
some lawyers (especially junior ones) think, the day after a deal closes: "if I
could only go back and fix this" (or, "I have no idea what is in that
document"). It strains credulity to conclude that contracts as finalized
represent the best that smart, highly motivated, and well-paid lawyers can do
to make their clients' rights and duties clear to a court.4°
But nobody takes seriously "cleaning up" a contract after hard-won
negotiations. Why not? A few familiar reasons suggest themselves. In
revising to clarify terms or preclude inconsistencies, new areas of disagree-
ment might emerge between the clients (perhaps in situations where the
hands-on individuals involved might be blamed by their seniors), or a lawyer
may discover something she missed. Or one side may reassess a decision
made during the negotiations to leave a strategic handle-that is, to stay
silent and thereby leave open a litigation position. If the agreement's terms
are revisited, the transaction could fall apart. Thus, parties may reasonably
decide that signing less-than-clear documentation is their best choice. In this
regard, Richard Posner argues that "[d]eliberate ambiguity may be a
necessary condition of making the contract; the parties may be unable to
agree on certain points yet be content to take their chances on being able to
resolve them, with or without judicial intervention, should the need arise., 41
Posner goes on to claim that: "[p]arties .... may rationally decide not to
provide for a contingency, preferring to economize on negotiation costs by
delegating completion of the contract to the courts should the contingency
39See supra note 4. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider why the process has
people negotiating and drafting, including, most importantly, as the agreement is being finalized,
when they need sleep.
4°Some additional evidence supporting this argument-that contracts importantly serve
functions other than specifying the parties' rights and obligations to a court-is that contracts contain
provisions that parties know are unenforceable (such as "party X's obligation is enforceable
notwithstanding the party's bankruptcy") or that parties know are largely useless as grounds for
contract damages (such as a contractual obligation to notify the other party if one's insurance
coverage ceases to be in effect). This point is discussed in Hill, supra note 4, at 52-53 (describing
other provisions importantly serving functions other than specifying the parties' rights and
obligations to a court).41Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1581, 1583 (2005).
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materialize. This is especially likely if they think there is only a slight
probability that the contingency will materialize. 42
In my view, the "strategic handles" argument-that parties may
conclude that unclear language allowing for a litigation position may be
preferable to attempts to raise and resolve the issue directly--does indeed
explain some failure to complete contracts. Consider the RAM-URI case
discussed above. The argument accords as well with my experience as a
corporate lawyer. Agency costs may also play a role. Corporate lawyers
may want to avoid the embarrassment of seeing what nonsense got into the
agreement during the frenzy of the negotiations, as may agents (of the
clients) who did the hands-on negotiating on behalf of their principals. The
lawyer and client-agents can discourage revisiting the contract by suggesting
that doing so might endanger hard-won agreements.
I am far less persuaded that parties to complex business contracts stop
sooner because they are saving themselves time and money, relying on
courts to fill their gaps or construe their ambiguous language. Real-life
negotiations certainly do not feel as if any expense is being spared. To the
contrary, no loose end or open point that anyone identifies as such is left
undiscussed or unresolved. Moreover, junior lawyers responsible for the
day-to-day drafting and negotiating (but not responsible for when the deal is
considered "done") are given a message very much to the contrary: if a
contingency, no matter how remote, occurs that you did not provide for, or if
some language you wrote turns out to give the other side a good argument,
your professional advancement will suffer. Finally, if the money-saving
explanation was correct, we might expect that the more likely contingencies
would be those addressed in complex business contracts.43 To the contrary,
421d. In a roughly similar vein to Posners first argument quoted in the text, George Geis
argues that:
indefinite contracts are sometimes created because an imprecise term--combined
with judicial willingness to fill gaps-can generate an embedded option. In other
words, each party may think that the deal can be performed, at a minimum, by
complying with the vague term in a manner favorable to the other side. But there
is also a chance that one side will be able to secure his preferred interpretation of
the vague term through persuasion or litigation-especially under the current trend
toward a loose indefiniteness doctrine and greater judicial gap filling. This
possibility can be viewed as an embedded option, which the party may seek to
exercise if future uncertainties play out in a particular way.
George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664,
1669 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
43Given that the "forms" used for contracts already contain unlikely contingencies, the
money-saving explanation might have some validity if the set of contingencies dealt with in each
successive agreement were the likeliest set. I think that even that limited claim isn't tenable,
notwithstanding the example to the contrary in supra note 5. Lawyers in my experience wouldn't
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the set of contingencies we see addressed do not seem to correspond linearly
to the set of more likely contingencies." Remote contingencies are often
addressed; what seem like more likely contingencies are left unaddressed.45
Still, some of the traditional explanations-a combination of leaving
strategic handles, agency costs on account of lawyers and agents of the
clients wanting to conceal mistakes from their principals, and nobody
wanting to find areas of disagreement that might endanger a hard-won
willingness to consummate a deal-are clearly an important part of the story.
But none of this explains why law firms do not try harder to have
"clean" contracts, regularly updated, that they require their lawyers to use.
While in terrorem incentives do indeed make junior lawyers fear missing
something and throw enormous energy at not doing so, why make their jobs
harder? The task is challenging in any event-even the smartest and most
energetic lawyer may miss something, and this is particularly true for a
junior lawyer. Why not take advantage of the resources the firm has
available to do the best it can in this regard-the time and reflection of smart
and experienced people who are not in extremis? Moreover, lawyers have
incentives to not be seen as obstructionist deal hinderers-these incentives
can dilute the in terrorem incentives. Clients, and their agents, can also
blame the lawyers for not having caught something that later becomes an
criticize the lawyer's draft's inclusion of a long provision to deal with a remote contingency, as
Freund's alter ego did. And even if, in a particular deal, only the likelier contingencies were
addressed, one would still be left to understand why parties didn't try to achieve the far larger cost
savings that could be achieved by starting with cleaner contracts.
"This point is discussed in Hill, supra note 3, at 72-73 (providing an explanation based on
path-dependence as to which contingencies are addressed and which are not). Of course, "most
likely contingencies" means those appropriately considered as such ex ante.
45Consider in this regard In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d. 27 (Del. 2006).
Ovitz became president of Disney. After an unsuccessful one-year tenure, he was terminated, not
for cause, and given $130 million in severance pay. Id. at 35. Various court opinions in the case
noted that the compensation consultant who worked with the board to design the compensation
package had not fully computed how much Ovitz would be entitled to if he were terminated other
than for cause. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 770 (Del. Ch.
2005). It is generally known that "for cause" terminations are rare, because the standard is so high-
serious misbehavior is required. Thus, it was likely that any termination would be not for cause.
The parties presumably intended that one possible not for cause termination would yield a significant
payout: that Ovitz's skills at his previous job simply weren't the skills needed for the Disney job. In
re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 43. Indeed, an important reason the severance package was large
was that the two jobs were quite different. Id. at 36-37. But, importantly, it was also known that
both Eisner and Ovitz had strong (even difficult) personalities. Id. While it may have been
expressly contemplated that Ovitz would be paid for the risk that his talents wouldn't serve him as
well at Disney as they had at his previous job, what actually happened--that Ovitz's employment
was quickly determined not to work out in circumstances falling short of a for-cause termination but
apparently reflecting less than best efforts by Ovitz (and a personality clash with Eisner) was
arguably sufficiently likely, even ex ante, that it should have been addressed to prevent a $130
million payout in such circumstances.
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issue, giving the firm additional incentive to try to prevent as many mistakes
as it can. A ready process exists to minimize the possibility that contract
documents are missing something or include a "mistake"-that law firms
keep up-to-date forms that get rid of murky drafting, ambiguous cross-
references, problems with definitions, and the like. Why is it not being
used?
The foregoing strongly suggests that parties are not doing what they
can to make their contracts clear to a court. The lack of clarity has an
expected cost: the murkier the contract, the higher the possible litigation
expenses (one would think), and the wider the settlement range, making
settlement less likely than it otherwise might be.46 The murkier the contract,
the more likely it is that what was supposedly agreed upon will turn out to be
amenable to disagreement ex post. The murkier the contract, the likelier it is
that by reviewing it ex post, in the context of a possible or actual lawsuit, a
party can construe provisions or omissions in a manner adverse to the other
party, regardless of what the parties intended. So, parties are apparently
subjecting themselves to unnecessary uncertainty and cost by stopping the
contracting process when they do. They work hard throughout the process,
poring over each word endlessly, and at a certain point-not when they are
satisfied that all glitches have been caught, but rather, when they have
"sufficiently agreed"-they pronounce themselves done and sign the papers.
This is puzzling. At least as puzzling, and perhaps more puzzling, is
why parties are apparently not taking advantage of another way to reduce
costs and perhaps uncertainty: arbitration. Arbitration is surely cheaper,47 if
46That litigation, and particularly, pretrial procedure, is exceedingly costly, is a common-
place observation. Some commentators observe that a subset of cases is disproportionately
responsible for the costliness; this is the very subset at issue in this article, involving high-stakes
cases and large law firms. See, e.g., Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh
Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 395 (N.D. Ill. 1992). In this regard, consider, too, that one
important impetus to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), was to stop plaintiffs from being able to
go on "fishing expeditions." The lawsuits at issue were characterized as "have price drop will sue";
one of the provisions of the PSLRA was that plaintiffs needed more than conclusory allegations to
be able to subject the defendant to typical (and onerous) discovery requests. See also Griffen Terry,
A Critical Analysis of the Formulation and Content of the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 869, 869 (1995) (noting that 1993 amendments were in
response, in part, to "excessive cost and delay inherent in... litigation"); Martha Neil, Litigation
Too Costly, E-Discovery a "Morass," Trial Lawyers Say, ABA J., Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.aba
joumal.com/news/litigation-too-costly-Ie-discovery-a-morass-triallawyers- say (discussing the
excessive costs associated with discovery).
47ndeed, it is interesting to consider why pretrial procedure cannot be made less costly or
onerous. For instance, why do parties (or lawyers) not develop reputations for conducting only
nonstrategic discovery? It is hard to answer such a question definitively, but the process may be
noisy enough, and may be unpredictable enough, that it will be very hard to establish in a manner
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not more certain. But a recent article by Ted Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller,
"The Flight From Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration
Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, '48 found "[il]ittle
evidence ... to support the proposition that these [large, sophisticated]
parties routinely regard arbitration clauses as efficient or otherwise desirable
contract terms. The vast majority of contracts did not require arbitration;
only about 11% of the contracts did."
49
What about other ways of reducing costs and uncertainty? One way
might be to waive a jury. But Eisenberg and Miller find that there are very
few jury waivers in large commercial contracts. 50 They argue that "our
results suggest that juries can add value to complex commercial adjudi-
cation."5' I offer another explanation-for the "stopping sooner" contracting
practice I have discussed, for failure to choose arbitration, as well as for the
failure to waive juries: the uncertainty and costs of litigation serve as a bond
the parties give against precipitous recourse to litigation, aligning the
parties' incentives to resolve any disputes without formal resort to the court
system. Returning for a moment to the failure of parties to waive juries,
juries might increase the uncertainty, and perhaps the costs, of litigation and
hence increase the size of the bond.
52
How do these bonds work? Again, they increase the expected cost of
litigation for each party: each party knows that should it commence
litigation, the other party will be able to impose significant costs. And some
of these bonds also arguably increase uncertainty. The outcome of a trial
involving a murky contract, or one involving a jury verdict, should be more
uncertain than one involving a clearer contract or a verdict rendered by a
judge. Thus, giving this bond discourages litigation.
Discouraging litigation serves another important function: it binds
together, and helps craft and hone norms for, the complex transacting
that is verifiable that one was not being strategic. The client can blame her lawyer or the other side,
for instance. The next best option may be to keep for oneself the option of being strategic, which in
effect requires that the other party have the option as well.
4"Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight From Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L.
REv. 335 (2007).
41Id. at 335.
5
°Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from an
Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 1. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 539, 541 (2007).
"Id. at 587.52Eisenberg and Miller note that "[c]ontracts with low standardization are associated with
lower waiver rates." Id. at 542. This, however, does not support my argument as much as it might
initially appear. In contrast to my approach, the authors categorize the types of contracts at issue
here as having "medium standardization" because they measure standardization by uniformity of
choice of law provision. Id. at 556.
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community in which transacting parties operate. These norms encompass
the end game, but also entry into relationships and relationship preservation.
Law may be limited in the extent to which it can influence conduct. Even if
contracts were clearer, the uncertainty and cost of legal process would be
substantial, not to speak of the length of time involved in pursuing a lawsuit.
The uncertainty may be nearly intractable. Many of the agreements are
highly and individually negotiated; it is therefore unlikely that precedent
exists to guide interpretation of many of the provisions that might be the
subject of litigation. Even those that are not so highly and individually
negotiated, such as "cookie-cutter" agreements (that is, multiple agreements
using the same basic model, as are used for fimancings done in series, such as
many leveraged leases and mortgage-backed securities) nevertheless have
not generated much precedent. And even if a contested provision itself was
previously interpreted, the fact situations are sufficiently complex that they
are hard to stylize into precedent that could be readily and easily applied in a
subsequent dispute in which that provision was at issue. Contrast the types
of provisions at issue, and the types of arguments that could be made with
respect to breaches, with their corollaries in contracts for simple commod-
ities, in which there is, for instance, a requirement to deliver commodity X,
of Y quality, on Z day.53 One approach contracts use to supply flexibility is
the use of standard-like terms such as "materiality" and "reasonableness" and
"best efforts." But litigation of these provisions has been, to be polite, a
mess. Community consensus may very well be better at establishing what is
meant when these terms are used and punishing breaches of the associated
duties (and norms), as well as establishing and enforcing more generally
what counts as acceptable (and unacceptable) conduct in the course of a
contractual relationship. The dynamic is path-dependent, and self-
reinforcing. Once the norms for negotiating and contracting are established,
seeking additional increments of precision may signal one's propensity to
litigate, which may in turn signal that one is a less desirable transacting
53Indeed, I have elsewhere contrasted complex business contracts with simple contracts for
commodities. As to the latter, Professor Lisa Bernstein has argued that parties effectively make two
contracts: one, the end game contract, that literally means what it says-ten business days is ten
business days-and the other, the contract during the relationship, in which the parties' agreement is
actually the terms agreed upon as modified by norms of the industry and of their relationship. See
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1798 (1996). As to the former, I argue that there are
infinite numbers of contracts. The contract as written scarcely has one determinate meaning, and
importantly serves to set the stage for (re?)negotiation when the transaction is not going as one or
both parties intended; moreover, the parties' "contract" when they are getting along may be better
established with reference to their relationship than to the physical document laying unconsulted in
someone's drawer. See Hill, supra note 4, at 54 n.57, 57.
2009]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
partner. Asking for the kind of review I have said people do not ask for,
after the negotiations have ended but before the documents are signed, may
indicate distrust of the other party as well.
It is critical to note, however, that the reputational community I have
described has, and needs, legal enforcement as a backstop. The bond that
the parties give-the bond that constrains them from litigating--can not,
should not, and will not, be "too" large. The contract has to have some
appreciable amount of detail and cannot just leave everything to the
relationship; the results of litigation can not be "too" indeterminate. If a
party is truly an "outlaw," as a practical matter not sufficiently amenable to
legal process, the mechanism will not work as it needs to. 54 Consider in this
regard the well-known corporate law case, Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland,
N. V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,55 involving Credit Lyonnais's attempts
to enforce a corporate governance agreement for MGM against the bank's
borrower, the entity to which it had lent money to acquire MGM.56 The
borrower never repaid one cent of its significant borrowings, in excess of $1
billion dollars.57 Credit Lyonnais did not call a default when it initially was
entitled to, agreeing instead to acquire significant control over the
management of MGM (and other rights), as specified in the form of a
corporate governance agreement, should the borrower not honor its obliga-
tions to the bank.58 The borrower did not honor its obligations, making
increasingly specious arguments about forgeries, lack of authority, and so on,
as well as actually manufacturing forged documents, making physical threats
against the bankers, and the like.59 It managed to avoid significant penalties
for some time; the individual most responsible fled to Italy and was pursued
by authorities in many jurisdictions. The bank suffered serious losses,
requiring it to be bailed out by the French authorities; it also suffered
considerable embarrassment. 6° The title of an article by David McClintick in
54This point is made as to law generally in Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive
Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1717, 1752-58 (2006).
55Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. 12,150, 1991 WL
277613, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099, 1103 (1992).561d. at *1, reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1103-04.
"Id. at *5, reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1110.58Id. at *7, *9, reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1113, 1116-17.
59Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, 1991 WL 277613, at *32, reprinted in 17 DEL. J.
CORP. L. at 1154-55.
6°The defendants attempted to reopen the judgment. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V.
v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. 12,150, 1996 WL 757274 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1996), reprinted in 22
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1186 (1997). In its opinion, the court noted:
It appears that, after the trial of this case, the events giving rise to it have been the
subject of a number of criminal and civil actions in several different jurisdictions,
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Fortune magazine says it all: "The Predator: How an Italian Thug Looted
MGM, Brought Credit Lyonnais to its Knees, and Made the Pope Cry.
61
As this example suggests, the system does best when parties rely on
extra-legal forces for increments for which it is well suited: to deal with
interactions among somewhat heterogeneous parties in a larger transactional
community,62 where some basic commonalities of principles and values can
be presumed, but it is considered fair game to take advantage to "some
degree." Norms arise as to how the community will regard some types of
behavior that might fall within the realm of taking advantage: as to, for
instance, whether waiting to make each payment until the end of the
applicable grace period is acceptable, or whether, when a payment is late,
calling a default is acceptable even if the lateness does not adversely affect
the recipient. Where basic commonalities cannot be assumed, extra-legal
forces are less effectual, and recourse to law is far quicker; contracts written
with parties with bad reputations cost more to negotiate and draft precisely
because of the greater expectation that such parties will exploit every
including California, Switzerland and Italy. Mr. Parretti is currently maintaining
an action in California against Credit Lyonnais, seeking monetary damages for an
alleged conspiracy by Credit Lyonnais to take control of MGM and Pathe from
him. In addition, Parretti has been convicted in Delaware Superior Court of
perjury relating to his introduction of altered evidence into the record of this case.
Finally, Parretti's associate in the MGM-Pathe transaction, Florio Fiorini, is
currently serving a prison sentence for bank fraud in Switzerland arising out of his
dealing with Credit Lyonnais, and is facing similar charges in Italy.
Id. at *2, reprinted in 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1192. The court found no reason to reopen the
judgment. Id. at * 1, reprinted in 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1190. On October 12, 1999, The New York
Post reported that "[e]x-MGM Chairman Giancarlo Paretti was nabbed by Italian police on fraud
charges based on a U.S. extradition warrant. He fled to Italy in '95 after conviction on perjury and
forgery in the U. S." Paretti Bust, N.Y. POST, Oct. 12, 1999, at 40. The Irish Times reported that he
was tried in abstentia in France in 1998. French Court to Try Paretti for MGM Fraud, IRISH
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1998, at 51. The New York Law Journal reported that:
White & Case has found a novel litigation strategy. The firm is representing
French bank Credit Lyonnais in its Los Angeles federal fraud suit against Italian
financier and former MGM owner Giancarlo Paretti. Yesterday, Mr. Paretti was
undergoing a deposition in White & Case's Los Angeles office when FBI agents,
whom the firm had informed of Mr. Paretti's whereabouts, arrested him in
connection with a French warrant for alleged embezzlement at MGM in France.
He was safe until he left Italy, which has no extradition treaty with France. Under
French law, the bank's civil claims will be heard at the same time as the criminal
charges, offering quicker restitution if Mr. Paretti is convicted than possible in the
U.S. suit, said White & Case partner Richard J. Holwell.
Today's News Update, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19, 1995, at 1.61David McClintick, The Predator: How an Italian Thug Looted MGM, Brought Credit
Lyonnais to its Knees, and Made the Pope Cry, FORTUNE, July 8, 1996, at 128.621f the parties are sufficiently homogeneous, extra legal forces may do more in supplanting
legal forces, and may leave less room for "acceptable" amounts of strategic behavior. See Hill &
King, supra note 15.
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possible loophole in the contract, something that is less of a concern with
parties with better reputations. We can expect that Giancarlo Paretti's next
transacting partner, if he can find one, will require gold-plated assurances, in
the form of promises from, or access to monies of, reputable third parties.
Two important objections can be made to my argument thus far. First,
given litigation costs and uncertainty, why is an additional bond, in the form
of increased costs and uncertainty, needed? Second, how can keeping a
contract murky be a bonding device to limit litigation when it may increase a
party's available causes of action and possible payoff?.
My answer to these objections requires an account of how the bond I
have hypothesized works, and the contexts in which litigation might arise. I
make a few assumptions; from my practice experience and my discussions
with practitioners, I believe that these assumptions are widely held and
uncontroversial. First, I assume that there is a general relationship-
preserving norm in the complex business community against bringing
litigation except if there has been a serious attempt to resolve the dispute or
an extraordinary circumstance of some sort. Second, I assume that a party's
threshold ability to sue is importantly not linearly related to what the parties
intended and addressed in the contract. There are indeed "clear breaches."
However, many circumstances that yield losses can be argued to be breaches;
a party who looks hard enough to find a plausible argument to bring a suit
against the other party will most likely succeed. This is so for a clear or a
murky contract, although it is, of course, more so for the murky contract.
But it is not feasible to make a contract clear enough to foreclose suit for
anything other than clear breaches: where there is a strong enough will to
bring suit, there is a way.
If a party wishes to preserve its reputation, reputational costs of
violating the no-quick-recourse-to-litigation norm will weigh significantly on
how it chooses to proceed. An additional bond, over and above those costs
and the well recognized costs and uncertainty of litigation, is probably not
necessary to discourage litigation in the normal course; if the loss is
extraordinary, especially if there is a clear breach, the party may choose to
litigate, and, in such circumstances, there may be no reputational cost. That
being said, if there is a clear breach, the other side should find it worthwhile
to settle. And this should be so regardless of whether there is a clear or
murky contract or, indeed, regardless of whether the party is in relationship-
preserving mode or not (unless it is in end game with respect to the
community as a whole).
Now, consider a party willing to incur the reputational costs of
litigation, especially where the loss motivating it to sue is not associated with
a clear breach. Perhaps the party is facing losses that could put it in end
game. Perhaps the party wishes to acquire a reputation for being litigious.
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Perhaps, in an agency cost dynamic, the person or people making the
decision to litigate have some personal antipathy towards the other company
or its CEO. While "in the long run" agents of this sort should not survive,
the short and moderate term can last quite a while. A CEO might have
enough other good qualities that a propensity to litigate precipitously might
not disqualify her from a position as a CEO. Indeed, the very traits that
might lead to too-ready recourse to litigation, such as decisiveness, aggres-
siveness, and independence, might be quite valuable in other contexts.
Where reputation is not a bar, litigation might seem cheap enough that it
would be worthwhile. And a party that was not in relationship-preservation
mode might "play dirty," trying to impose costs on the other side as much as,
if not more than, pursuing the case on the merits.
The increment my theory addresses is the one between a murky
contract and a clearer one, where reputation does not constrain a party from
suing and, particularly, where what motivates it to sue is not a clear breach
under the contract. What the murky contract does is lower the costs for the
party being sued (call it Party 2) to countersue. Once it is sued by a party not
in relationship-preservation mode (here, Party 1), relevant norms will permit
a largely commensurate counterattack (and perhaps even a more-than-
commensurate counterattack). The increment of extra costliness and uncer-
tainty brought about by a murky contract-the weapons Party 2 now has
available-should serve to dissuade all but the most determined Party 1 -type
parties. But giving Party 2 this weapon comes at the cost of increasing the
size of Party l's expected payoff-it, too, has more grounds to sue and more
probably of prevailing in a suit-hence, it might seem, giving Party 1 more
impetus to sue. This is a fair theoretical objection to my argument.
However, as a practical matter, this effect is swamped by the size of the
weapon given to Party 2. Once a party no longer constrained by reputation
has weapons to use against Party 1, it could use them. Party l's cost-benefit
computation should, therefore, be far less likely to favor a suit, especially for
a murky breach.
IV. COST MINIMIZATION MORE BROADLY
A. How Does Contracting Minimize Parties' Costs?
The foregoing has implications for a broader understanding of
contracts and the contracting process. Uncontroversially, parties contract
until the cost of further contracting exceeds the benefits. One way of
articulating parties' costs and benefits is to distinguish between several types
of costs: the classically articulated end game costs (including the probability
that the parties will enter into end game), relationship maintenance costs, and
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another type of cost-the cost of establishing and specifying the terms of the
parties' relationship. The literature as to the latter type of cost focuses more
on a subset of this type of costs: specification costs.63 However, establishing
and specifying the parties' relationship is a different, and broader, endeavor,
as I discuss below.
64
The contracting process I have described minimizes the sum of
specification costs and end game costs; it probably has a neutral effect on
relationship maintenance costs, except insofar as the relationship as
established during the specification stage was such as to warrant greater or
less wariness and vigilance. Consider, for instance, the typical example of
providing for remote contingencies. The consensus view is probably that it
reduces end game costs but increases relationship establishment and specifi-
cation costs. On my account, the analysis is more complex. The increase in
relationship, establishment, and specification costs is considerable. But end
game costs may not decline much, or even at all; they may even increase. 65
As I argued earlier, except at the extremes, the parties' ability to impose costs
on each other in litigation is often not closely correlated with the merits of
their position regarding the dispute at issue. Indeed, the merits may not be
determinable within a broad range, nor do the parties think they would be.
Moreover, if parties negotiate such contingencies beyond what is standard in
the community, they may crowd out some of the community's relationship-
preserving norms, making litigation (and general cost increasing wariness)
more likely.
Relationship establishment and specification costs encompass both the
traditional elements and some less traditional ones. They include the costs of
parties coming to feel comfortable with one another-to determine that they
want a relationship, in the first instance-as well as the more typically
considered costs of addressing all immediate issues (for example, how much
the immediate payment is, and how it is to be made) and each party's "hot
button" issues.
63See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193,214-15,224-
25 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
64See Hill, supra note 3, at 70-71 (discussing cost minimization in contracting).
65In this regard, I do not think less effort spent on drafting appreciably increases error costs
in the range at issue. Consider the URI/Cerberus decision. See supra text accompanying notes 19-
38. I argued that the language being interpreted was sufficiently complex that commentators were
divided as to how the court would rule, and many offered reasoned and sound arguments for their
positions. See supra text accompanying note 20. Indeed, the concept of "judicial error" in this
context scarcely seems to capture the reality: a choice of one among alternative plausible
interpretations of some tortured opaque language.
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Information is given and conveyed through the contracting process.
The process can be direct; however, it is also often indirect, "a messy
communicative act."66 Simply interacting over a protracted period of time
reveals a great deal: What sort of people does the other side hire? Are they
easygoing or irritable? How confident are they about their recordkeeping?
How do they react when they are asked a question about their existing
contracts or the lawsuits against them? How much authority have they given
their negotiator may say something about what sorts of hierarchies the firm
has. The customs and conventions of the transacting community always
serve as a backdrop. The information revealed when the U.S. lawyer
presents her one hundred page long first draft to the other side (in the United
States) is quite different than the information revealed when the German
lawyer presents the identical draft to the other side in Germany.67 Norms
and conventions develop as to when to stop, what to cover, what contractual
fixes to use, what increments of precision to leave unaddressed, and at what
stage the parties consider themselves done and ready to legally bind
themselves through contracting formalities. Parties stop when the costs of
continuing exceed the benefits. The costs include not only those of
articulating additional increments of precision, but also those of violating
norms as to when the process should stop, as well as those relating to the
antilitigation bond being given.
As has been extensively discussed in the literature, norms and
conventions also develop to govern the parties' relationship when they are
getting along. But I have argued that there are also conventions and norms,
critically, as to when litigation is acceptable and what tactics are acceptable
in litigation in particular circumstances. Interestingly, and consistent with
the view of litigation costs as a potential bond, what comes to be seen as fair
game in litigation itself, especially a suit brought in response to a murky
breach, includes arguments that are quite "a reach"-not rising to the level of
frivolous under Rule 11,68 but certainly quite aggressive, and tactics in the
discovery process that are quite aggressive as well.
Contrast my view with that of Richard Posner. Discussing minimizing
the transaction costs of contracting, Posner argues that:
66Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLuM. L. REV. 1700, 1757
(2003). Kysar uses the term to describe purchasing decisions by consumers. Id. His use is
analogous to mine: one is directly doing X (asking a question, buying a product), but in doing so,
one is doing many things that are equally important (conveying one's vigilance, perhaps, in the case
of a question about pending lawsuits, or conveying one's civic mindedness, in the case of buying a
product made in an environmentally friendly way).67Hill & King, supra note 15, at 897.
68FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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[w]hen a dispute over the contract's meaning arises, the parties
will first try to resolve it themselves. They will do this not only
because of the costs of litigation, but also because of the
reputation factor that I discussed earlier: the party demonstrably
in the wrong on the interpretive issue will hesitate to force the
issue to litigation; he is likely to lose and in any event may
acquire a reputation as someone who does not honor his
commitments. The more carefully drafted the contract is, the
easier it will be for the parties to resolve a dispute over its
meaning when the dispute first arises, in other words at the
prelitigation stage.69
Posner thinks carefully drafted contracts reduce the parties' costs; as to some
increments of care, I have argued to the contrary. Clearly, careful drafting
costs more than careless drafting; Posner thinks the more-than-
commensurate benefits result in less litigation because the party "demon-
strably" in the wrong's expected value computation will push the party to
settle or concede. Posner would be right if the set of disputes likely to arise
was largely coextensive with the set of disputes where one party is
demonstrably in the wrong and especially, if more careful drafting made the
two sets more nearly coextensive. But, as I have argued, a loss that does not
reflect a clear breach may nevertheless tempt a party to bring a lawsuit. In
some such cases, the other party may have the better argument, but the party
incurring the loss will not be "demonstrably wrong." Reputational costs (and
straightforward monetary costs) should generally deter a party from bringing
a lawsuit if it is "demonstrably in the wrong." I think, however, that even if
parties expended more effort in their contract drafting, losses tempting a
party to sue will often not be associated with a clear breach in which one
party is "demonstrably in the wrong." Reputation will deter many suits, even
if only on account of the antilitigation norm I have discussed. Monetary
considerations, and perhaps reputation, will limit suits where a party clearly
will lose. But a large set of potential suits remain.
Posner also argues that the probability of litigation is lower as the
costs of negotiating and writing the contract increase: "[T]he more time the
parties spend negotiating and drafting the contract, the lower the probability
that a dispute over meaning will arise, because more of the possible
contingencies will be covered by explicit contractual language."70 Again, I
69Posner, supra note 41, at 1614.701d. at 1608.
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disagree with Posner. I do not think the relationship between negotiation
and drafting costs and probability of dispute is at all linear. Whether a
dispute arises depends largely on whether one or both parties becomes
unhappy in the relationship, which often turns on the world changing in the
way the parties did not expressly anticipate, and in a manner that they did
not, and could not, have comprehensively and satisfactorily provided for
before the fact. More effort put towards drafting within any reasonable
range is not likely to ameliorate the problem commensurate with the added
cost.
B. Evidence from Private Equity
I have argued thus far that the relevant relational and reputational
community has a norm against precipitous recourse to litigation; parties bond
themselves by entering into contracts that are less clearly written than they
easily might be. But of course, when the stakes get high enough, parties
enter end game and resort to litigation. This is precisely what has occurred
in the context of private equity acquisitions, where there are many lawsuits
involving purchasers, sellers, and the financial institutions that were to
finance the purchases. The dynamic is self-perpetuating. The losses are, by
definition, significant and, as more suits are brought, whatever reputational
constraints there might have been are lessened or eliminated.
In this regard, see a recent blog posting:
Wachovia's Lawsuit Against Providence Equity:
Providence Equity Partners, a private equity firm, signed a deal
to purchase television stations from Clear Channel. Wachovia
agreed to finance the $500m deal. Providence and Clear
Channel agreed to a reduced purchase price because the
stations revenues were down. Now Wachovia wants out,
arguing the price reduction is not enough and that the deal
should be canceled. Wachovia is arguing that the price
reduction itself is a material adverse change, triggering the
MAC [(Material Adverse Change)] condition in the deal
agreement and, incorporated by reference, a similar MAC
condition in the financing arrangement. This case is odd
because Wachovia must convince a judge that a reduction in
price (and thus in the financing commitment) is an "adverse"
change. The case is representitive [sic] of the new kind of
"hardball'[sic] being played in the buyout financing markets.
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Reputation (for honoring one's word) be damned; save the
ship.71
Interestingly, the plaintiffs argument, at least as explained in the blog,
scarcely seems persuasive. This should not be surprising. As I discussed
above, if a party to a complex business contract wants to impose costs on the
other by pursuing litigation, it can almost always do so. Plaintiffs will
manage to find some legal argument; even if the argument could not prevail
at trial, it will nevertheless enable costly discovery, interrogatories, and filing
of motions.
V. CONCLUSION
In the picture of complex business contracting I have presented here,
law plays a nuanced and limited role. "Good enough" contracts and "good
enough" law work together to encourage the development of a reputational
community in which appropriate norms can develop and be enforced. These
norms allow for and promote flexibility consistent with relationship preser-
vation. They proscribe behavior the community deems unacceptable, even if
the behavior at issue can neither be specified ex ante nor verified ex post.
They also favor relationship preservation over precipitous recourse to
litigation, with parties bonding themselves thereto by potentially subjecting
themselves to costly and uncertain enforcement.
What follows from these arguments? First, my account helps explain
several puzzling phenomena. Why are contracts not written more clearly,
with fewer confusing cross-references ("anything in the foregoing to the
contrary notwithstanding")? Why do parties not opt out, in whole or in part,
more often than they do, from formal legal process, for instance by providing
that their disputes will be resolved via arbitration? Why do parties not waive
juries more often than they do? My answer is that costly and uncertain
enforcement serves as a bond; increasing precision in a contract beyond a
certain point does not provide a benefit that exceeds its cost and indeed, may
even be a cost.
71Business Law Prof Blog, Wachovia's Lawsuit Against Providence Equity, http://Ilaw
professors.typepad.comlbusinessjlaw/2008/week9index.html (Feb. 27, 2008) (emphasis added).
The parties eventually settled. See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Michael J. de la Merced, Lawsuit is
Settled Over Sale of Clear Channel's TV Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at C.3. Related litiga-
tion involving the acquisition of the remainder of Clear Channel after its sale of TV stations also
settled. See Clear Channel Commcns, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 13, 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/739708/000095013408009540/d56929e8vk.htm.
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Second, my account suggests a way to view various doctrines that
push parties towards specification of their agreements but do not absolutely
prohibit less-than-fully-specified agreements. These doctrines encourage the
development of a reputational community to take up the slack, and comple-
ment parties' incentives to develop reputations and maintain them within that
community. Consider in this regard courts' claims "that they do not make
contracts for the parties 72 in the face of doctrines by which gap-fillers,
default provisions, and interpretive rules can be used to do precisely that.
73
The parol evidence rule, too, is amenable to a similar analysis.74
Third, my account provides an argument for dethroning rhetoric and
doctrine that emphasizes the parties' subjective intentions.75 In many of the
cases at issue, there may not be a subjective intention. A search for objective
"intention" may be more appropriate, if only to economize on court time and
effort, so long as it does not appear that one party was strategic in leaving the
door open for a subsequent dispute. A similar rationale may also favor
majoritarian rather than information-forcing defaults in such circumstances.
Fourth, my account may support an argument that sophisticated parties are
better off with somewhat indeterminate law.
Finally, my argument also suggests a different perspective on the well-
worn subject of "incomplete contracts." It is well known that parties do not
write contracts that tell the court what they want in each possible state of the
72Rulli v. Fan Co., 683 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio 1997) (citing 1 ARTHURL. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 4.1 (rev. ed. 1993)).
73See Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198, 204 (Ky. 1964) (stating that "courts should not
expend their powers to establish contract rights which the parties, with an opportunity to do so, have
failed to define").
74What about the effect of the parol evidence rule on litigation costs? Interestingly, some
litigators have told me that even if the jurisdiction governing their case is Willistonian, they
nevertheless seek in discovery evidence the court conceivably might exclude. Given that most cases
do not proceed to trial, and the vast bulk of litigation expenses and time are spent in discovery, even
in Willistonian jurisdictions the parol evidence rule may therefore not serve as much of a constraint.
75Contract interpretation is canonically directed towards determining parties' subjective
intent. For a thoughtful discussion, see Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 353 (2007). Solan contrasts the subjective approach used for interpretation to the
ostensibly objective approach used for contract formation:
At the same time as courts profess to commit themselves to an objective approach
in their analysis of contract formation, they repeat as a constant refrain in cases
involving the interpretation of contracts that their one concern is to discover the
intent of the parties, and reach a decision that will vindicate that intent. They say it
so often that it cannot be explained by an occasional reversion to a nineteenth
century-like slip of the tongue.
Id. at 388. Professor Solan goes on to suggest that "objective" talk might be better explained as
either that the objective fact pointed to is good evidence of subjective intent, or that the promisee's
reasonable and subjective belief should estop the promisor, whatever the promisor's actual intent.
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world; I argue here that they rationally do not try as hard as they could,
notwithstanding contrary indications in the rhetoric and trappings of the
contracting process. My account suggests a way to describe what parties
might (or might not) find it worthwhile to complete in incomplete contracts.
It also sheds light on the dynamics of the contracting community, showing
how law can interact with norms, path dependence, institutional dynamics,
and agency costs to produce the kinds of contracts we see. My ultimate
conclusion, though, may be this: the now-established recognition of the
importance of extralegal forces in contracting needs to be better integrated
into the scholarship of contracting; the analysis of statutory law and court-
made law needs to take into account the limited and intricate role of law in
parties' contracting behavior.
